Combining Monitors for Runtime System Verification1
		1This research is sponsored by DARPA under contract number N66001-00-C-8058. The views herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the supporting agency.  by Levy, Joshua et al.
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 70 No. 4 (2002)
URL: http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs/volume70.html 16 pages
Combining Monitors for Runtime System
Verication
Joshua Levy and Hassen Sadi and Tomas E. Uribe
System Design Laboratory
SRI International
Menlo Park, CA. 94025
flevy,saidi,uribeg@sdl.sri.com
Abstract
Runtime verication permits checking system properties that cannot be fully veried
o-line. This is particularly true when the system includes complex third-party
components, such as general-purpose operating systems and software libraries, and
when the properties of interest include security and performance. The challenge is
to nd reliable ways to monitor these properties in realistic systems. In particular,
it is important to have assurance that violations will be reported when they actually
occur. For instance, a monitor may not detect a security violation if the violation
results from a series of system events that are not in its model.
We describe how combining runtime monitors for diverse features such as memory
management, security-related events, performance data, and higher-level temporal
properties can result in more eective runtime verication. After discussing some
basic notions for combining and relating monitors, we illustrate their application in
an intrusion-tolerant Web server architecture under development at SRI.
1 Introduction
Most computer systems cannot be completely veried before they are put in
service. The high complexity of complete elded systems places them beyond
the reach of exhaustive formal analysis tools, such as model checkers and theo-
rem provers. Furthermore, many systems rely on third-party components, for
which a complete specication (or even source code) is not available. Finally,
the nature of most formal analysis tools requires that they check a model of the
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system rather than the system itself. If this model is inaccurate, important as-
pects of the actual system behavior can be ov erlooked. The specications used
to certify a system may be incomplete, wrong, or make implicit assumptions
that are violated by the runtime environment.
Runtime verication addresses some of these problems by checking that the
actual system execution satises desired properties. Rather than checking that
all computations of (a model of) the system satisfy a property, as design-time
v ericationdoes, runtime verication checks that the particular computation
generated when the system is executed is correct, av oidingthe state-space
explosion that limits the scalability of exhaustive v erication tools.
However, important choices must still be made when analyzing the run-
time behavior of a system, including the level of abstraction at which the
runtime v erication is performed, how detailed and comprehensive it is, and
what specications or properties are expected to hold. F or example, the com-
prehensiveness of the checks is often traded o against eÆciency.
In many cases it is insuÆcient to monitor operation at a single level of
abstraction. Likewise, monitoringmay not be restricted to a single component,
or to a single aspect of operation. The correct behavior of the monitoring
mechanism may depend on properties that must themselves be monitored
separately.
These concerns are particularly acute when the system is intended to main-
tain security properties. A hostile attack er can try to defeat or circumv en t
the monitoring mechanisms themselves, and a successful attack may disable
the monitors intended to report it.
In this paper, we discuss and illustrate how runtime v erication benets
from the combination of multiple monitors at multiple levels of abstraction:

The use of many specialized monitors results in greater awareness of even ts
in the system.

By combining the information provided by the monitors, stronger properties
that relate dierent aspects of the system can be checked at runtime.

The modularity arising from separate monitors facilitates the sharing and
reuse of monitoring information and mechanisms.
Outline: We present some preliminary denitions in Sections 2 and 3. Sec-
tion 4 describes our target application, an intrusion-tolerant server. Section 5
presents a set of examples where monitors are combined. Section 6 presents
conclusions, and related and future work.
2 Preliminaries
We are interested in checking runtime properties of distributed systems, which
may be composed of multiple machines, each running multiple processes, con-
nected by a network. While we do not attempt a full formalization of this task
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in this paper, below we describe some of the aspects that it should address.
System state: Informally, the system state is given by the union of the states
of all the machines, together with the state of the network.
For a particular machine, the system state can be described at various
lev elsof abstraction. At the hardware level, it is given b y the state of the
processor, registers, and memory. At the OS lev el, it is the state of the OS
and the processes currently running. For a given process or thread, the (local)
state is given b y the value of its program variables, execution stack, and
control location. The system variables should be suÆcient to describe all of
the components and abstractions considered.
Denition 2.1 A system state is an assignment of values to a set of system
variablesV.
Fixing the set of system variables is a modeling choice, and implies choosing
a certain minimum lev elof abstraction (such as CPU registers and memory
locations), but is useful in dening our terminology below.
Denition 2.2 A run r of the system is an innite sequence of system states
r : s
0
; s
1
; s
2
; : : :
States and runs can be mapped to higher lev els of abstraction, where
an abstract variable is dened in terms of a set of original concrete system
variables. This raises a number of issues, such as the problem of the scope
of the abstract variables [15]: in practice, the denition of the abstract state
will be local to a module, process, or subroutine. When the local process is
not running, the abstract values will be undened. In general, the mapping
between abstract and concrete variables is not xed (e.g., a program variable
refers to dierent memory locations from one run of the program to the next,
and other values canbe dynamically bound).
Observability at dierent levels: Usually, when we focus on a particular
aspect of the system, only a subset of the system state is visible. F or example,
an application might not know what the full OS state is, including what other
processes are running. The OS may know about all the running processes,
but may not hav e direct access to the internal state of a particular process.
Denition 2.3 (Local view) Given a system state s and a set of (possibly
abstract) variablesL, we write sj
L
to indicate the assignment that s induces
in the variables in L, that is, the local view of the state. We allow for variables
in L to be undened (e.g., at a state where they hav e not been initialized).
Time granularity: In general, a component or monitor can only observe
some of the system transitions, and may overlook transitions. Also, a transi-
tion at the software abstraction level may correspond to multiple steps at the
hardware level, and, furthermore, may be in terrupted and resumed. For in-
stance, an application-level monitor will not know when an interrupt is called.
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For this reason, we can expect most of the properties being monitored to be
stuttering invariant [1].
Previous work has identied distinctions between process-level, statement-
lev el,and instruction-level monitoring [11]. Each presents dierent trade-os
between ov erhead,implementation complexity, and precision. Our goal is to
allo wmonitors at all of these levels, as well as other more generally dened
abstraction lev els.
3 Monitors
A monitor is a module that observes a given set of system variables at a
particular level of abstraction, gathers information about these variables, and
makes some of this information available to other monitors and components.
In particular, we expect monitors to report the violation of expected system
properties.
Denition 3.1 A property ' is a set of runs of the system. For a run r, we
say that r is a model of ', and write r j= ', if r 2 '. We write r j= :', or
equivalently r 6j= ', if r 62 '.
A common way of describing such properties is using linear-time temporal
logic (L TL)[16]. Properties can be classied as belonging to the safety or
liveness classes [2], where safety properties are those whose failure can be
detected b y a nite prex of the run. A monitor that halts and issues a
warning or alert is, b y denition, checking a safety property. (On the other
hand, not all safety properties are monitorable [23].)
There are system properties that cannot be expressed as sets of runs,
including possibilistic and general branching-time temporal properties [3,6].
This includes a number of security properties, such as various formulations of
noninterference [25].
We will focus on the detection of property violations rather than property
enforcement [21].
Denition 3.2 A monitor M has a set of observable state variables V
M
and
a set of auxiliary variables O
M
, which are visible to outside modules. The
monitor operates by sampling the variables in V
M
and updating the variables
in O
M
, and raises an alarm when it considers that a violation has occurred.
Given a system run s
0
; s
1
; s
2
; : : :, the monitor sees a subsequence of states
s
i
0
; s
i
1
; s
i
2
: : :
restricted to the variablesV
M
, that is,
s
i
0
j
V
M
; s
i
1
j
V
M
; s
i
2
j
V
M
: : :
where 0  i
j
 i
j+1
for all j  0.
The auxiliary variablesO
M
are assumed to be part of the global set of
system variablesV.
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In practice, the variables in V
M
are best dened locally, rather than in
terms of global but low-level system variables. This is the case, for example,
when we annotate high-level code to check in variants.
We do not make any assumptions regarding what mechanism a monitor
M may use to observe the variablesV
M
, or what internal state M may hav e.
Most monitors can be assumed to be nite-state, though software monitors can
hav e an unbounded stack (such as the pushdown automata used in [24]). A
simple example of a formally derived monitor is a nite-state automaton that
describes a temporal safety property at a particular level of system abstraction
[7 ], and is composed with the system through code annotation.
In practice, the power and reliability of monitors can vary.
Denition 3.3 (Monitor characteristics) We say that a monitor M is
complete with respect to a property ' if for any run r such that r 6j= ', M
is guaranteed to raise an alarm. A monitor M is sound with respect to a
property ' if whenever M reports an alarm, then r 6j= ' (no false alarms).
An example of an incomplete monitor is one that can skip steps at the
chosen abstraction level, and thus miss states that violate the desired property.
Many intrusion detection systems are examples of incomplete and unsound
monitors: they can produce false alarms, and fail to report violations. Note
also that the property check ed b y a monitor may be implicit in the monitor
implementation, and not available in declarative form (such as a temporal
logic formula).
A monitor can be defeated if its execution is halted. Technically, the safety
property that the monitor is intended to check might not be violated, if the
execution steps that modify the observed variables are halted as well. This
is the case for monitors that check the internal consistency of applications
through source code annotations. We investigate this issue in more detail
below.
Assume-guarantee specications: We can specify the properties of mon-
itors in an assume-guarantee fashion [1].
Denition 3.4 Given a system S, a monitor M and properties '
1
and '
2
,
we write
['
1
]M ['
2
]
to indicate that M is sound and complete with respect to '
2
, when restricted
to runs that satisfy '
1
, assuming that M is not disabled. That is, M is
guaranteed to soundly report a violation of '
2
for any run where '
1
holds.
Note the analogy to the partial correctness described b y standard Hoare
triples, which are conditioned on the termination of the program. That M
can reliably monitor ' (\total correctness") is thus decomposed into t wo prop-
erties: the rst can be written as [true]M ['], and includes soundness. The
second states that M cannot be disabled in a run of S.
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If we write [[M ]] to indicate the set of runs for which the monitor M does
not raise an alarm, then ['
1
]M ['
2
] can be expressed as ('
1
\ [[M ]])  '
2
.
Denition 3.5 (Monitor composition) If M
1
and M
2
are monitors in S,
we write M
1
M
2
to indicate the monitor that raises an alarm whenever M
1
or M
2
does so.
Informally, if M
1
checks that property P holds, and M
2
checks Q, then
M
1
M
2
checks P ^Q: if the combined monitor does not raise an alarm, then
both P and Q hold. We also hav e
[[M
1
M
2
]] = [[M
1
]] \ [[M
2
]] :
We can then write simple rules such as
[P
1
]M
1
[Q
1
] ; [P
2
]M
2
[Q
2
]
[P
1
^ P
2
] (M
1
M
2
) [Q
1
^Q
2
]
[P ]M
1
['] ; [']M
2
[Q]
[P ] (M
1
M
2
) [' ^Q]
and
[P
1
]M
1
[Q
1
] ; P ! P
1
; Q
1
! Q
[P ]M
1
[Q]
where general S-temporal validity is required of the antecedents [16]. In this
way,runtime and static v erication canbe combined.
The abov e rules are all instances of a single general rule:
[A
i
]M
i
[G
i
] ;
(
V
i
(A
i
! G
i
))! A! G
[A] (M
1
 : : :M
n
) [G]
In the following section, we describe ways in which monitors can be tightly
combined in practice, b y sharing information in addition to conjoining their
alarms.
3.1 Combining Monitors
As we hav e discussed, monitors can be embedded in application code, or in
the OS; they can be a separate process, or be composed of separate modules
that observe networks and in terfaces.
The  composition operator described abov e means only that the various
monitor alarms are conjoined. In practice, monitors can share and exchange
other information. The modes of monitor combination that we consider are
shown schematically in Figure 1. An arrow from N to M indicates that the
observable variables of M include some of the auxiliary variables of N , that
is, O
N
\ V
N
is not empty.
2
In all cases, we assume that the monitor alarms
2
In general, circular information ows can occur, where both O
M
1
\V
M
2
and O
M
2
\ V
M
1
are nonempty. However, it may be simpler to merge M
1
and M
2
into a more complex
monitor in this case.
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Complementary:
bettercoverage
Dependency:
workreuse,efficiency
Correlation:
strongerproperties
Fig. 1. Combinations of monitors (information ow)
are conjoined. The combination modes depicted are:

Complementary monitors: In this case, monitors M
1
and M
2
inde-
pendently check their properties. The net eect is to obtain the monitor
M
1
M
2
as described in the previous section. Note that even when the mon-
itors do not communicate at runtime, their design can exploit the fact that
other monitors are present. For instance, the correct behavior of M
1
may
depend on assumptions that are checked b yM
2
, as we will see in Section 5.

Correlation: Given monitorsM
1
andM
2
, monitorM
3
relates their activity
b y including among its observable variables someof the auxiliary variables
ofM
1
andM
2
. This allows checking properties that are stronger than those
check ed b yM
1
and M
2
alone.

Dependency: A special case of correlation, where a monitor checks prop-
erties that depend on information passed on b yother monitors. This com-
bination can increase the eÆciency of the overall monitoring subsystem,
allo wing thereuse of potentially expensive monitored data.
4 Application: The DIT Server Architecture
Our motivation and sample application is the design and implementation of
an intrusion tolerant web server arc hitecture[22]. The Dependable Intrusion
T olerance (DIT) architecture is shown schematically in Figure 2. One or more
redundant tolerance proxies manage user requests, and forward them to a
redundant application server bank.
The goal of the DIT system is web content distribution with high in-
tegrity and availability, at reasonable cost. This is done b y using low-cost
COTS soft ware, with relatively low assurance, in a high-assurance intrusion-
tolerant design. The architecture is based on the observation that COTS web
server soft ware is feature lled and complex, and tends to contain security
vulnerabilities. However, dierent programs and operating systems hav e dif-
ferent vulnerabilities, so a system with diverse web servers on diverse platforms
should provide greater assurance of availability and integrity, assuming a reli-
able mechanism for collecting responses from the redundant servers, validating
them, and forwarding them to the clients.
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Proxies
IDS
Leader
COTS Application Servers
Clients
Fig. 2. Sc hematic view of the intrusion-tolerant serv er arc hitecture
Proxy
Server
Regime
Manager
Alert
Manager
Challenge-
Response
Application
Servers
IDS
Peer
Pro xies
Clien ts
Fig. 3. High-level view of proxy implementation
This function is performed by the proxy, which resides on a hardened plat-
form running a small amount of custom code. The simplicity and customized
nature of the proxy soft ware makes it more amenable to hardening than the
application servers. The proxy accepts client requests, forwards them to a
number of application servers, and compares the content returned b ythe ap-
plication servers. If enough agree, the proxy sends the corroborated answer
to the client.
An agreement regime determines which servers are queried b y the proxy
for each client request, and how suÆcient agreement is determined. F or exam-
ple, a particular regime may specify that each request be forwarded to three
dierent application servers, randomly chosen, and that a simple majority is
required among the three replies before the result is sent back to the client.
The proxy and application servers communicate over a private network
that is monitored b y an in trusion detection system (IDS). The agreement
regime changes over time as events such as disagreements and IDS alarms are
reported.
Figure 3 shows the main components of our proxy implementation. The
regime manager is responsible for executing the content agreement protocol,
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Start
Accept
request
Forw ard
request to
n servers
Identify
suspicious
servers
Send
response
to clien t
Ask more
servers
Service
unavailable
invalid request
valid
suÆcient
agreement
insuÆcient
agreement
suÆcient
agreement
limit
reached
Fig. 4. Generic conten t agreement protocol
described in Figure 4. The alert manager takes input from the IDS subsystem
and the challenge-reponse protocols, and noties the regime manager when
changes are warranted.
A challenge-response protocol is constantly executed as an additional in-
tegrity check. It provides a relatively high-latency check on the in tegrity of
les and directories on the proxies and servers, b y periodically issuing a chal-
lenge that must be answered by computing a one-way function of the challenge
and the giv enle.
The challenge-response protocol also provides a liveness check: an alarm is
raised if a response is not received. This is an example of a specialized monitor
that can help ensure that other monitors are alive and working. (Note that
a successful subv ersion of this protocol is highly lik ely to be detected b y the
IDS subsystem.)
5 Examples of combination
We now describe examples of various kinds of runtime monitor combinations.
Code annotation and process monitoring: A common approach to v er-
ifying program execution at runtime is source code annotation. This is most
applicable to properties that are easily expressed in the source language and
in the context of the program design, such as simple assertions, and temporal
properties that can be expressed with a few auxiliary variables.
Embedding the runtime v erication into the program itself allo wsclose
and accurate monitoring, but does not give any assurance that the properties
hold for the system as a whole unless there are guarantees that the annotated
source is actually running. Verifying this is nontrivial when general-purpose
operating systems are used and security compromises are possible. Howev er,
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mechanisms to catch such violations do exist, such as those used in host-based
intrusion detection systems. Operating system processes can be monitored so
that it is diÆcult for an intruder (or a fault) to stop or kill a program without
being detected.
Let P
1
be the source code consistency property, and P
2
be the system
property that states that the application program is running. In this example,
the code annotation monitor M
A
is complete with respect to the in ternal
property P
1
, but not with respect to the system-level property P
1
^ P
2
, since
M
A
cannot guarantee P
2
. Thus, we need a complementary combination of
monitors that will catch violations of a more global system property.
Such a combination is used in the DIT proxy design. Code annotations
check assertions about variables and monitor the execution of the request-
handling threads, while a separate monitorM
E
is used to verify uninterrupted
execution of the entire multithreaded process. The latter monitor accesses
fairly tamper-resistant k ernel information via the /proc lesystem mecha-
nism present in many Unix-type operating systems. A formalization of this
argument is
[true]M
A
[P
1
] ; [true]M
E
[P
2
]
[true] (M
A
M
E
) [P
1
^ P
2
]
In addition, we use StackGuard [4] to ensure that no buer overows occur
in the proxy code. This can be seen as a third complementary monitor.
Note that M
A
and M
E
observe dierent sets of state variables. M
A
checks
properties of application software variables, such as source code variables and
execution stack, while M
E
monitors the operating system's state. This illus-
trates how checking a property that relates many kinds of state variables is
made easier b y decomposing it into subproperties that each concern a more
restricted set of v ariables, for which monitors are easier to build.
Counting connections: As an example of correlation between monitors,
consider a server program that accepts client connections from the network and
supplies responses. If the machine running the program is a dedicated server,
then the n umber of network connections to the machine should equal the
number of clients being serviced b y the program. A violation would indicate
a bug in the server soft ware or an unauthorized connection.
T oaccurately monitor the number of requests being serviced, we need a
monitor for the server software, which is obtained by annotating the code. T o
count the number of actual client connections for the whole system, we need
an operating system-based monitor. Finally, a third monitor takes input from
the rst two and checks that they agree.
We are currently incorporating such a monitor into the DIT proxy, using
/proc to supply system connection information, as mentioned in the previous
example.
The number of connections to the server process could also be counted from
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the outside, without altering the program; our approach has the advantage
of being able to v erify additional properties such as, for instance, that valid
responses are being sent for each connection.
Resource and performance monitoring: A more general example of cor-
relation concerns verication of properties that relate resource use and perfor-
mance. P erformanceand resource use may each be monitored independently,
most likely using dierent mechanisms. But properties that involve both types
of information are also useful. Given a simple server application where client
requests are expected to have approximately equal cost, we may want to check
that memory and CPU usage are proportional to the number of currently con-
nected clients. Violation of this property could indicate a memory leak, a bug
in the server operation, or a client that is exceeding anticipated or acceptable
resource allocations.
Combining monitors for network security: Combinations of monitors
need not be limited, of course, to systems consisting of a single machine. A
networked collection of computers can be monitored, with monitors v erifying
the state and operation of various platforms, the network, and their combined
operation. While the quantity of information ow and the level of trust in
communications are usually more limited in a network than between soft-
ware components on a single computer, the necessity for eectively combining
separate monitors is ev engreater, since dierent mechanisms are required to
monitor dierent platforms and the network itself.
Network in trusion detection systems that check for possible violations of
security in networked systems are already common [19]. Since they are de-
signed for general-purpose networks and because of the volume and complexity
of general network data, network IDSs do not v erifymost aspects of network
operation, but instead focus on particular violations, such as the presence of
packets containing known attacks, or particular types and sequences of pack-
ets. However, in applications where v erication of stronger network security
properties is desired, network monitoring can be combined with other types
of monitors for increased accuracy.
As a simple illustration, consider a database, behind a rewall, accessible
via an authenticating web server. Monitoring in ternal network connections
to the database becomes more eective if the monitor is aware of the user
associated with each request, and when users log on and log o using the
authentication mechanism. By verifying that queries follow login and precede
logo, many requests that arise from penetration or circumv ention of the
rewall would be caught.
Checking request forwarding in the DIT system: Finally, let us sketch
how, in the DIT system design, monitors combine to verify a key property P :
P : The proxy sends client requests to a correct set of application servers.
The proxy server program maintains two k ey internal values: (i) the list
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Fig. 5. Information ow for DIT monitors
of servers that are considered uncompromised, and hence may be queried,
and (ii) the current regime, which determines the n umber of uncompromised
servers that should be queried for each client request. P means that a request
is sent to the proper number of distinct application servers that are considered
to be uncompromised, or is not sent at all if there are not enough such servers.
The property P can be expressed in terms of several other properties:
P
1
: The proxy server is running.
P
2
: Each regime transition is allowable, according to a design specication.
P
3
: The current regime is actually follo wed (i.e., the proxy sends a n umber
of requests equal to what is specied in the current regime).
P
4
: Servers considered compromised are never queried.
T ogether,P
1
{P
4
imply P (assuming that the regime at system startup is
correct).
Property P
1
is v eried by the OS-based /proc monitor M
E
described ear-
lier. The interface to the alert manager allows regime transitions to be moni-
tored, using an interface monitorM
I
, which works as long as the proxy server
is running. M
I
is able to verify P
2
by checking each transition against a spec-
ication that describes when regimes are allowed to change. The specication
states how the regime is increased when disagreement is observed, and how the
regime can be decreased if the number of uncompromised servers drops below
the number needed b ythe regime. The ev ents that trigger the transitions are
observable on the interface.
To verify that the number of requests actually matches the current regime,
a network monitorM
N
, running on a separate machine connected to the inter-
nal network, snis traÆc to see which application servers are the recipients of
each forwarded request. The monitor compares this with the current regime
and the current list of uncompromised servers, which it receives in network
messages fromM
I
. (M
N
also detects the absence of such messages.) ThusM
N
v eries both P
3
and P
4
.
The relevant types of system variables monitored in this exampleare
(i) OS variables on the proxy (/proc)
(ii) Application software variables (proxy code)
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(iii) Protocol status variables (current regime and current list of uncompro-
mised servers)
(iv) Network variables (pack ets being sent, their sources and destinations)
P
1
concerns the rst set of system variables,P
2
concerns the second, and P
3
and P
4
both concern the last t wo.
T o summarize, Figure 5 shows schematically the information ow between
the three monitors. The formal argument to show that the three monitors
combine to verify P is
P
1
^ P
2
^ P
3
^ P
4
! P;
[true]M
N
[P
3
^ P
4
] ;
[true]M
E
[P
1
] ; [P
1
]M
I
[P
2
]
[true] (M
E
M
I
) [P
1
^ P
2
]
[true] (M
E
M
I
M
N
) [P
1
^ P
2
^ P
3
^ P
4
]
[true] (M
E
M
I
M
N
) [P ]
Of course, there remains the task of ensuring that the three monitors will
not be disrupted, which in this case we assume will be established b y other
formal or informal arguments.
6 Conclusions
We hav e argued that in practical systems, runtime monitors at dierent levels
of operation must be combined. The design of the system, and the choice of
monitoring levels and mechanisms, should take the eect of monitor combina-
tion into account. The advantages of combining monitors can be summarized
as follows:
(i) Additional monitors can co ver missing properties, such as unchecked as-
sumptions (cooperation)
(ii) By sharing information, stronger properties can be monitored (correla-
tion)
(iii) Greater eÆciency and modularity in the monitoring mechanism
There are many practical challenges to the eective implementation and
combination of monitors. F or instance,it would be desirable to hav e a secure
kernel module that supports the exchange of information between monitors
implemented at dierent levels of abstraction.
6.1 Related Work
The combination of runtime monitors has not been addressed in previous
work, though much work has been done to develop and test individual moni-
toring mechanisms. We mention a few that are relevant to the techniques and
applications we hav e discussed.
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Intrusion detection can be seen as an important class of runtime monitoring
and v erication, particularly in the case of specication-base d IDS [12,13].
Given a specication of potential intrusions, design-time verication can help
identify security vulnerability and exploits as well.
The lack of type safety in C programs leads to notorious security aws,
such as buer ov erows, as exploited by the Code Red worm [18]. Several tools
address the need for checking type safety properties of C and C++ programs
at runtime. The CCured type system [17] uses a combination of static and
runtime pointer analysis to catch type errors. Cyclone [10] is a more strongly
typed dialect of C that inserts additional runtime checks. StackGuard [4] is a
compiler security mechanism that catches many buer overow attacks (which
we use for the proxy compilation).
The MaC language [15,11] provides a formal language for describing mon-
itors and automatic tools for instrumenting code. The Alamo monitor archi-
tecture [9,8] instruments C code in more detail, resulting in less eÆcient code.
Techniques for instrumenting C and C++ code and analyzing the results are
presented in [14].
F uturework: Our formal framework may be extended to explicitly include
abstraction layers, including abstraction and renement relations between
variables, components, and monitors. The assume-guarantee proof notation
can be similarly extended.
We hav e not discussed design issues, such as how a designer knows what
monitors to use and how they should be assembled. However, this approach
to runtime verication may nicely complement design methodologies that in-
clude design-time v erication as well. O-line verication and analysis could
be applied as thoroughly as possible, and runtime monitors could then be
chosen and assembled to check all remaining critical properties. The choice of
monitors can also follow the design assurance argument , which describes why
the arc hitecturemeets the desired operational and security requirements [5].
As we noted in Section 2, some important security properties are not sets of
traces [25,20]. Hence, runtime checks alone cannot guarantee these properties.
Runtime v erication must be combined with design-time analysis to ensure
such properties.
Another direction for future work concerns extending our framework to
include property enforcement , as done b y the security automata of [21 ];our
current focus is on detecting safety property violations.
Finally, another challenge is to extend our framework to include real-time
properties and monitors, with access to a global or local system clocks. Real-
time constraints allo w expressingmany untimed progress properties as timed
safety properties, which can therefore be monitored.
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